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NOTES
Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate
Burden Lie?
I. INTRODUCTION

Unfettered access to the courts is the cornerstone of the American
concept of justice, yet even today we are far from achieving this
ideal. Recently much progress has been achieved in improved legal
services for the poor;' but the poor will never have completely free
access to the courts unless the American rule that each litigant must
bear the burden of paying his own attorney's fees is changed. Surely
reform in this area is as vital as in any other, for a legal system which
refuses an innocent party full compensation for expenses incurred in
asserting his right necessarily denies him full redress for the injury
he has suffered.
Since the first note of protest in 1925,2 a few writers, 3 recognizing
the intimate relationship between attorney's fees and full relief for
the wronged party, have urged the adoption of some form of the
English system, which taxes all costs, including attorney's fees, to the
losing litigant. Much of their work went unnoticed and, as a result,
the reform movement became quiescent; however, expanding con-4
cepts of social responsibility have revived interest in the subject.
This note will analyze the reform movement, the conflicting policies
involved, and the reasons for the previous failures of reform, with a
view toward formulating a meaningful solution to the problem.
1. For an excellent discussion of this "new wave in legal services," see Note,
Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 Hv. L.
REv. 805 (1967). The authors suggest that the neighborhood law office furnishes the
key for the concept of decentralized legal assistance. It is further suggested that
the source of the growing awareness of this problem is an increased realization that
equal justice can be accomplished only through increased accessibility of legal services.
See also Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes,
63 CoLuM. L. REv. 973 (1963).
2. The first public protest issued against the American system of fees, and in favor
of the English system, was the 1925 Report of the Massachusetts Judicial Council.
See First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 11 Mass. L.Q. 7 (1925).
For a description of its contents, see text accompanying note 27 infra.
3. See Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 13 CALF. ST. B.J. 42 (1938); CoswAy,
Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U. CN. L. REv. 313 (1941); Ehrenzweig,
Shall Counsel Fees Be AllowedP, 26 CALIF. ST. B.J. 107 (1951); Coodhart, Costs-,
38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
4. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why not a Cost of Litigation?,
49 IowA L. REv. 75 (1963); Stirling, Attorney's Fees: Who Should Bear the Burden?,
41 CALIw. ST. B.J. 874 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical
Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966).
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Further, the note will focus upon one aspect of the law on fees
that has received remarkably little attention-the interrelation of

federal and state laws on fees. As a result of the conflict between
the policy of uniformity of result demanded by Erie and the policy
of a uniform federal procedure established by the Federal Rules,
federal courts sitting in diversity suits must decide whether the issue
of attorney's fees is "substantive" or "procedurar in order to determine
whether federal or state law is to be applied. This problem, ac-

centuated by the fact that courts and authorities are divided on the
matter, will be examined in connection with the overall question of

who should bear the ultimate burden of attorney's fees.
Throughout this note it is important to keep in mind the distinction between costs and fees. Fees are those charges which a party
to a suit must pay his attorney for services rendered in the progress

of the case, while costs are those expenses of litigation awarded by
statute, usually, but not always, to the prevailing party and taxed

against the losing party.5 Both will be discussed in this note, but the

term "costs" will not include fees, since under the American system
fees are rarely awarded by statute as costs.
II. TiE SocIAL PR OBLEM
A. The Historical Background
Outside the Chancellor's power to award costs and fees to a victorious party,' no costs were awarded to parties at early English
law.7 The idea that the losing party should be taxed with costs
and fees developed early in the English system.8 The common law
rule as to costs in actions at law was modified in 1275, when the
5. O'Neil v. Kansas City, S. & M. Ry., 31 F. 663, 664 (W.D. Tenn. 1887). Several
additional meanings may be attributed to the term "costs." First, it may include all
items of litigation expense; second, it may refer only to those items whose actual
expense may be taxed as costs; third, it may mean statutory costs, or those costs
allowed by statute even though they fail to represent actual costs. See Vincennes Steel
Corp. v. Miller, 94 F.2d 347, 348 (1938). See also Distler, The Course of Costs of
Course, 46 CoaN. L.Q. 76 (1961). In this Note the term is being used in the third
sense which is the one used by most practitioners.
6. According to the great weight of authority, the Chancellor's power to award costs
originated by statute, 17 Rich. 2, ch. 6. However, courts of equity now can award
costs as an inherent power independent of statutory authority. See Stallo v. Wagner,
245 F. 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1917); Andrews v. Barnes, 39 Ch. D. 133 (1888); Jones v.
Coxeter, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 2 Atk. 400 (Ch. 1742).
7. 2 F. PoL~ocx & F. McrrAm, TAE IsToRY OF ENGLiSH LAw 597 (2d ed. 1898).

At early common law the unsuccessful plaintiff was amerced, with the revenue of the
fine going to the crown and not to the prevailing defendant. Further, even if the
plaintiff won, the defendant was not liable for any of the costs. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851); HULLoci,, LAW OF CosTs 2 (1793).
8. For a thorough discussion of the English history of costs and attorney's fees, see
Goodhart, supranote 3, at 851-72.
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Statute of Gloucester 9 awarded costs to successful plaintiffs. Through
subsequent legislation, culminating in the Statute of 1607,10 similar

costs were granted to successful defendants. Thus, by the time of the
American Revolution, the English system was well developed and
courts awarded costs, including attorney's fees, to the prevailing
party."

In early colonial
lish rule, whereby
party in actions at
recovery of fees to

America, most courts adopted the classical Engcosts and fees were awarded to the prevailing
law.' 2 Subsequent statutes, however, limited the
specific maximum amounts, such as "fifteen shill-

ings or one hundred and fifty pounds of tobacco."' 3 Moreover, these
early courts and statutes never adopted as their basis the theoretical
goal of the English system-that of full compensation for the wronged

party. Therefore, fees allowed by the early colonial statutes were
never increased to keep pace with the continual decline in the value
of money.' 4 Moreover, states subsequently joining the Union rarely
provided for any attorney's fees to be taxed as costs, and in no case
9. 6 Edw. 1,c.1 (1275). This statute originally applied only to an action for land,
but through subsequent modification full costs were given to any successful plaintiff
in any action at law. See Goodhart, supra note 3, at 852-53.
10. 4 Jac. 1, c.3 (1607). Professor Goodhart suggests that the slower development
of the law which gave costs to a successful defendant was due to the amercement of
the unsuccessful plaintiff, which was considered a sufficient punishment, though it
could not have been of much satisfaction to the victorious defendant. Goodhart, supra
note 3, at 853.
11. Later, important changes were made in the English system by the Supreme
Court of Judicature Acts, 36 & 37 Vict. c.66 (1873), 38 & 39 Vict. c.77 (1875). Under
the previous acts, costs followed the action, but these later acts placed the awarding
of all costs in the discretion of the court. The amount of costs is determined by the
use of complicated schedules in the court rules, and if the parties can not agree upon
a cost bill on that basis, a special officer known as a "taxing master" decides the costs.
See Goodhart, supra note 3, at 854-60.
12. See C. McComc , DAMAGES 235 (1935) [hereinafter cited as McConm~IcK.];
Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 CoLUm. L. REv.
78, 80 n.15 (1953), citing Atkinson v. Williams (1670), 3 REcoRDs OF THE CourT OF
ASSISTANTS, MASSAcHUSE=r5
BAY COLONY 203 (1928); Clarke v. Davis (1662), id.
at 130; Hakins v. Gooden (1660), id. at 86. However, not all writers agree that our
colonial courts initially followed the English rule. See Goodhart, supra note 3, at 873;
Note, Distributionof Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699, 700 (1940).
Compare Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 108, with Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 798.
It is submitted that the more persuasive authority follows the view that the early
colonial courts did adopt the English rule as to fees, along with other English procedure,
but that the prevailing attitudes of the period toward lawyers and the legal profession
were sufficiently strong to prevent the English rule from gaining any lasting support.
13. 5 LAws OF VIR-INIA 344 (Henning's ed. 1819). See also MAss. GEN. LAws
ch. 261, §§ 1, 23 (1932) (enacted 1795, maximum attorney's fee $2.50); COLONIAL
LAWS OF N.Y. ch. 185 (enacted 1709, maximum fee of 50 shillings); 2 SouTH CA OLINA
CooPEr's STATuTEs 86 (enacted 1694, maximum fee of 16 shillings).
14. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8710 (1953) (enacted in 1825, $2.67 fee
awarded for several different tasks); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 261, § 23 (1956) (enacted
1795, maximum fee of $2.50); N.H. IEv. STAT. ANN. ch. 525, § 13 (1955) (enacted
1815, awards $1 attorney's fee); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1635 (1962) (enacted in
1821, fee of from $1.50 to $3.00 awarded in prosecution of suit to judgment).
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made an adequate award.' 5 Consequently, early in the history of our
judicial system, the idea that fees should not be taxed as costs to the
losing party became firmly imbedded in our tradition; and even where
fees were allowed as costs, the sums remained nominal.
There is some disagreement concerning why the American states
developed a different rule. Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested that
this difference is due merely to an historical accident which occurred
when the state legislatures placed fixed limits on the amounts of fees
which could be recovered.' 6 He reasons that this mistake caused
lawyers and courts gradually to forget the real purpose and meaning
of those amounts.' 7 However, this explanation ignores the motivating
forces which initially induced those legislatures to place specific limits
on the amounts recoverable. Other writers have carried their analysis
one step further toward the origin of the problem, and have submitted
that the determining factors in the abandonment of the English system
were the distrust and hostility which early Americans felt toward
lawyers and the legal profession.' Undoubtedly this early suspicion
of lawyers, which was induced in a large part by the feeling that the
law was so simple a body of rules that counsel was not needed to
present a case, was influential in the shaping of restrictive legislation;
yet this attitude was simply a product of the social and economic conditions of the time. The real basis of the rejection of the English rule
lies not in mere historical accident nor even in the distrust of lawyers,
but cuts much deeper into the basic philosophies generated by the
nature of our society in its early history.' 9
Although it is true that those who formed our legal system drew
heavily upon the English tradition, it is equally true that this tradition was tempered by the particular attitudes of early American
15. In New Hampshire, for example, the prevailing party's recovery even today is
limited to the sum of $1. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 525, § 13 (1955); see Jacques v.
Manchester Coal & Ice Co., 78 N.H. 248, 100"A. 47 (1916). See also Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 453.060 (1963) (fee of $2.50 to $5 at law; $5 to $10 in equity); MINN. STAT.
ANx. § 549.02 (1945) (costs allowed of $5 to $10).
16. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 798-99. In fact, Professor Ehrenzweig uses the
specific example of the New York legislature of 1848, which, he asserts, made "the fatal
mistake of fixing the amount recoverable in dollars and cents rather than in percentages
of the amount recovered or claimed."
17. In summation, Professor Ehrenzweig comments that "it was this process of gradual
forgetting rather than a deep-seated moral argument that has apparently caused the
abolition of the prevailing party's right to the recovery of his counsel fees." Id. at 799.
18. See Goodhart, supra note 3, at 873; Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the
Conduct of Litigants, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 78, 80 (1953); Note, Distribution of Legal
Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699, 701 (1940).
19. That something more fundamental underlies the uniqueness of our system than
mere attitudes may be supported from an examination of the social and intellectual
histories of our country. See generally R. CARRINGTON, A MiLoN YEARs OF MAN
(1963); L. HARTz, FOuNDING OF NEW Socm iEs (1964); F. TurNEa, ThE FnorNxn
iN AMERICAN H-isToRy (1920).
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life.20 Our early society was characterized by the sparsely settled
frontier community and by the rugged individualistic spirit of the
pioneers who lived in those communities. 21 The special effect this
attitude has had upon our system of judicial administration cannot
be underestimated, and is well stated in the following passage from
Dean Pound's The Spirit of the Common Law:
Its [our legal tradition's] respect for the individual makes procedure,
civil and criminal, ultracontentious, and preserves in the modem world the
archaic theory of litigation as a fair fight, according to the canons of the
manly art, with a court to see fair play and to prevent interference. Moreover it is so zealous to secure fair play to the individual that often it secures
very little fair play to the public. It relies on individual initiative to enforce
the law and vindicate the right. It is jealous of all interference with individual freedom of action, physical, mental, or economic. In short, the isolated
individual is the center of many of its most significant doctrines. 22

It is this early philosophy of intense individualism which, it is submitted, underlies the development of the American rule and the subsequent rejection of the English rule on fees. In our early days, the
pioneer's very existence depended upon his individual ability to cope
with the particular situation at hand. It was only natural that when
legal disputes arose, he relied upon himself to achieve justice inside
the courtroom, or outside it, rather than upon those "characters of
disrepute"2 who demanded payment for their services. Lawyers
were clearly a luxury and the legal system was a great forensic
battlefield of individual rights. Further, the assertion of individual
rights was so important to the early American that litigation flourished
and was encouraged under "[w]hat Dean Wigmore has called the
sporting theory of justice, the idea that judicial administration of
justice is a game to be played to the bitter end."24 Inherent in the
rules of this "sport" is the idea from which our rule on fees developed,
that is, the idea that each individual must bear whatever burdens,
20. One explanation for this fact is that a new government must "be the creation of
a willingness in its citizenry to submit" to the system designed and established for the
resolution of their disputes. Thus, "[a]t this stage of development, concern over points
of justice . . .is less important than encouraging persons into the established system."
Kuenzel, supra note 4, at 81.
21. Dean Pound has emphasized the great impact the early American concern with
individual rights has had on our legal tradition, and much of the following analysis in
the text is based upon his conception of our legal tradition. See R. POUND, Tim SpnuTr
oF =x CoMMoN LAW (1921). Turner, in his essay on the significance of the pioneer,
also concluded that the peculiarity of many American institutions may be traced from
the development of our nation as a frontier society. See F. TURNMA, supra note 19.
22. R.PouN, supra note 21, at 13-14.
23. See C. WAimEN, IhsToRY OF THE AImsaucA. BAR 4 (1911).
24. R. POUND, supra note 21, at 127. In fact, the courthouse was looked upon as an
arena of entertainment to which the public flocked to cheer on their favorite in the
battle of wits. Fair play during this "game" was demanded, and even the fist fights
which broke out in the courthouse were not interfered with. See McConxcx 258.
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including all costs, litigation might cause.25 Thus, the early American
not only favored litigation but believed that each litigant was to
wage his fight for justice by his own means. It was due to this attitude, which was clearly fashioned by the demands of a frontier society, that we chose to develop our own rule on fees rather than
adopt the one favored by the English legal tradition.
B. The Reform Movement
As our civilization became more and more centralized in the great
cities, concern with the individual necessarily gave way to a growing
concern for society in general. Man was no longer considered in isolation, but rather his rights were balanced with his fellow man's. Thus, if
one injured another, the latter should be compensated fully for his
losses. As a consequence of this change in attitude, reform of our
judicial system, including its rules on fees, received increasing attention. Furthermore, the phenomenal increase in court congestion emphasized the need for reassessing many concepts of judicial administration. Thus, a few writers, feeling our society no longer needed
the kind of "fair play" demanded by a philosophy of individualism,
urged that social righteousness, plus the practical necessity of reliev26
ing court congestion, demanded a change in our rule on fees.
In the first public pronouncement stressing the need for a new
system of costs, the Judicial Council of Massachusetts made the following comment:
In England the costs which the unsuccessful party has to pay consist (in
substance) in the expense he has wrongfully made the other party incur;
in other words, the unsuccessful party in England has to pay his opponent's
lawyer's bill as well as his own. The possibility of having to pay the lawyer's
bills of both parties to the action makes a plaintiff think twice before he
sues out a writ and a defendant think twice before he defends an action

which ought not be defended, and that is a direct deterrent on the number
of cases put or kept in suit .... There is another reason for adopting the

principle of substantial costs .. .[and] that is that it does justice .... On
what principle of justice can a plintiff wrongfully run down on a public
highway recover his doctor's bill but not his lawyer's bill? And on what
principle of justice is a defendant who has been wrongfully haled into
25. "Fair play" seemed to demand that no additional burden be placed on the party
unfortunate enough to be the loser. This attitude was clearly visible in many of the
early judicial decisions. For example, in St. Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355
(1857), the court stated that "[t]he parties in these cases should be encouraged to
appeal to the court on equal terms. The defendant should not be punished by being
compelled to pay not only his own counsel but such as the plaintiff may please to
select to advocate his claims against the defendant, but each should be left to conduct
his own case, and in his own way, and at his own expense beyond what the statute
allows in a bill of costs to the prevailing party." Id. at 366-67.
26. See note 3 supra.
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court made to pay out of his own pocket the expense of showing that he
was wrongfully sued?27

Later advocates of reform continued to emphasize that taxing of fees
to the losing party served the cause of justice and relieved court congestion by discouraging unfair and unnecessary litigation.2 There is
much merit in these ideas, for surely the possibility of having to pay
fees of both litigants would encourage a plaintiff to reconsider groundless litigation, or a defendant to consider carefully defending an action
justifiably brought, and would consequently encourage compromises
and settlements. Thus, one may see a shift from the early public
attitude of encouraging litigation as a means of asserting individual
rights, to the more modem social concept of encouraging settlement
and compromise.29
Moreover, the shift of emphasis from man's importance as an individual to his role as a member of society-perhaps best illustrated by
"The Great Society" and its "War on Poverty"-emphasized the need
for justice to be equally available to all, whether rich or poor.30
Crucial to this concept is a rule which places the burden of fees on
the wrongdoer who has caused the litigation. Under our present rule,
for example, the legal rights of the "little" man of our society are
not equated with those of the rich,31 since a party may utilize a
financial advantage to force, by delays and extended litigation, his
less fortunate opponent into an unfavorable settlement or into abandoning his valid claim.2 Ironically an outstanding example of abuse
27. Firs Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 11 MAss. L.Q. 7, 63-64,
(1925).
28. See Avilla, supra note 3, at 43; Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 109; Geller,
Unreasonable Refusal to Settle and Calender Congestion-Suggested Remedy, Report of
Committee on Comparative Procedure and Practice, 1962 ABA INTEaN'L & Comp. LAW
SEcroIN 117, at 134; Kuenzel, supra note 4, at 80. It is interesting to note that this
same result has been urged as a reason for maintaining the present system, since some
writers retain the idea that one must encourage litigation and avoid the encouragement
of settlements. See generally Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants,
supranote 18, at 702.
29. In recent years the constantly reiterated policy of our courts has been in favor
of disputed claims being settled outside the courtroom. See Bakke v. Bakke, 242 Iowa
612, 47 N.W.2d 813 (1951); Johnson v. Norfolk, 76 S.D. 565, 82 N.W.2d 656 (1957).
30. Since the injured party must bear the expense of litigation, only one who is
financially able can seek justice, despite the fact that the one who can afford justice
will be least likely to need it. For the view that the abolition of our rule on fees is an
essential part of the War on Poverty, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 793.
31. An example of this inequity is given by Professor Ehrenzweig from his own
personal experience as a penniless Austrian immigrant who was cheated out of his
belongings by an American moving company, and yet was prevented from recovering
his goods by the cost of his attorney's fees. The 'little" man today, he asserts, is only
given legal aid, not legal rights which he can enforce. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 4,
at 792, 796.
32. One writer has suggested that a large number of disputed claims remain in our
courts not only to seek proper remedies, but also to gain the financial advantage
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involves the Government, as many individuals and corporations will

yield to tax and antitrust claims simply because the maximum fine
would be much less than the cost of litigation.-s Additionally; many

feel that the ideal of justice is to make the wronged party whole,
at least so far as may be done by money, and that this ideal may be
reached only if the wronged party is relieved of all litigation expense.3 For example, in answer to the argument thatattorney's fees

are too remote to be included in damages,3 it is urged that due to
36
today's complex legal system which necessitates hiring a lawyer,
fees may be foreseen as a direct result of a wrong, and thus must be
37
included in the judgment if a party is to be fully compensated.

Thus, at the heart of the reform movement lie two fundamental concepts: (1) the idea that conflicts in our contemporary society should
be settled by compromise and adjustment rather than by litigation;

and (2) the idea that aims of justice, which can be achieved only if
the wronged party is made whole, are best served by a legal system

available to all on equal terms.
Such suggestions for reform of our present rule became even more

persuasive when it is realized that the United States is one of the
few countries in the world which does not allow the prevailing party
to recover some part of his attorney's fees. Most countries, such as
realized by being there. Kuenzel, supra note 4, at 78. The author further suggests that
an attorney so extracting a financial advantage may violate Canon 30 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer must decline to conduct
a civil cause or to make a defense when convinced it is intended merely to harass or
to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong." Id. at 79. Such an
abuse, it is submitted, is encouraged by our present rule on fees. Id. at 80.
33. For example, in two recent antitrust cases, 29 oil firms laid out $10,000,000 in
expenses before the case was thrown out of court, and three salt firms spent $750,000
in defending charges which would have carried fines of only $150,000. See Growing
Issue: High Cost of Justice, NATION'S Bus., May, 1963, at 78, cited in Kuenzel, supra
note 4, at 86 n.29. Similar situations have arisen where the Government asserts a tax
deficiency which would be far less costly to pay than to contest. This abuse surely
should be avoided.
34. A typical judicial expression of this attitude is found as follows in Sullivan v.
Old Colony St. Ry., 197 Mass. 512, 516, 83 N.E. 1091, 1092 (1908); "The rule of
damages is a practical instrumentality for the administration of justice. The principle
on which it is founded is compensation. Its object is to afford the equivalent in money
for the actual loss caused by the wrong of another." See aso Stoebuck, supra note 4,
at 202 n.1.
35. See Stapley Co. v. Rodgers, 25 Ariz. 308, 216 P. 1072 (1923); St. Peter's Church
v. Beach, supra note 25; United Power Co. v. Matheny, 81 Ohio St. 204, 90 N.E. 154
(1909).
36. It is glaringly apparent that our legal system demands a lawyer at every stage of
its criminal proceedings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Additionally, the great complexity of today's everyday life requires the presence of lawyers
in civil matters which, 60 years ago, would have been handled by the parties themselves.
37. It should be evident that for a wronged party to be made whole, all expense
directly caused by the wrong committed should be borne by the wrongdoer. See
Cosway, supra note 3, at 315; Stirling, supra note 4, at 877.
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Austria,- Switzerland, 39 France,40 and Hungary, 41 allow fees to the
prevailing party although the manner in which the awards are made
varies widely. The use of these rules on fees has apparently worked
with some success, especially in relieving crowded courts by encouraging settlement.42
C. The Failure of the Reform Movement
In spite of the fact that the arguments in favor of reform are quite
persuasive, the movement has not been notably successful. Unquestionably, the early philosophy of fair play and individualism embodied in Wigmore's "Sporting Theory of Justice" still acts as a
major obstacle to reform. The bar in its innate conservatism has
always resisted change, and as a result has been reluctant to depart
from the tradition of encouraging litigation. 43 Thus, despite the obvious need to relieve our system of judicial administration from the
strains of pioneer attitudes, many of the bar firmly believe that "the
right to sue without deterrence by the specter of the possibility of
paying an adversary's legal fees is part of our democratic tradition
and a bulwark of equality," and feel it is unfair further to penalize
the losing party. 4
38. Generally, the Austrian rule follows the English tradition of awarding fees to the
prevailing party. The court decides which expenses are necessary or reasonable on the
basis of a bill which the attorneys must submit at the end of a trial; if it appears a
party is not fully defeated, then the court will apportion the expenses pro rata. See
Baeck, Imposition of Fees of Attorney of Prevailing Party Upon the Losing Party under
the Laws of Austria, Report of Committee on Comparative Procedure and Practice,
1962 ABA INTERN'L & Cowp. LAw SEMCoTI 119; Schima, The Treatment of Costs and
Fees of Procedure in the Austrian Law, Id. at 121.
39. Although each Swiss canton has its own procedure, the general rule in each is
that the court in its discretion decides which party bears the costs, including attorney's
fees. See Baeck, Imposition of Legal Fees and Disbursements of PrevailingParty Upon
the Losing Party-Under the Laws of Switzerland, Id. at 124.
40. Since 1667, the French have required the unsuccessful party to pay court costs,
which include fees for the services of avouds (solicitors), though not of avocats
(barristers). However, the court hearing the case does in many instances have the
power to allocate either of the fees in any manner it deems fit. See Freed, Payment
of Court Costs by the Losing Party in France, Id. at 126.
41. In Hungary the loser must pay the winner's fees, but only in proportion to his
actual defeat which is to be determined by the court. Since the Communist takeover,
the court's discretion has been limited by the scale fixed by the state organization of
attorneys, and the importance of fees has declined somewhat since attorneys are considered state employees. See Dietz, Payment of Court Costs by the Losing Party under
the Laws of Hungary, Id. at 131.
42. "That the Continental systems are accepted and workable is attested by an
Austrian lawyer, who writes that, while there is some criticism of the fixed rates of
allowable fees, 'it can be said that no change of the system as such has ever been
requested by anyone."' Schima, supra note 38, at 124.
43. An additional barrier to change, it is suggested, is the quite natural fear on the
part of attorneys that the resulting decrease in litigation would correspondingly decrease
their fees and income.
44. Geller, supra note 28, at 118.
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So deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is this belief in the assertion of individual rights by litigation that it may be included in
our constitutional concept of due process. The following language of
Mr. Justice Black could support such an assertion:
[T]he Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as
to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole
history. Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of
what is fair and right and just. The more fundamental the beliefs are the
less likely they are to be explicitly stated. . . . In applying such a large,
untechnical concept as "due process," the Court enforces those permanent
and pervasive feelings of our society as to which there is compelling evidence of the kind relevant to judgments on social institutions. 45

Clearly those who believe that an individual has an inalienable right
of free access to the courts, which access is not to be blocked by the
fear of having to pay an opponent's fees, would assert that due
process, as defined above, demands the retention of the present rule.
Such judicial attitude is well exemplified in the following statement
by the Supreme Court:
It has not been accident that the American litigant must bear his own cost
of counsel and other trial expense save for minimal court costs, but a
deliberate choice to insure that access to the courts be not effectively denied
those of moderate means.46

Although most would agree that the concept that every man has a
right to go to the courts is included in due process as defined, the contention that taxing fees to the losing party would violate due process
is subject to two criticisms: (1) This assertion is premised upon the
belief that the fear of paying the fees of another would deter a man
from the courts. Such a view assumes that our judicial decisions are
more often wrong than right, for otherwise a man with a just claim
would surely not fear having to pay his opponent's costs. 47 (2) Such
45. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950).
46. Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 236 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring opinion). In the same case, Mr. Justice Black indicated that the right to litigate is not one that should be so burdened, when he commented that: "Items proposed
by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny. Any other practice
would be too great a movement in the direction of some systems of jurisprudence that
are willing, if not indeed anxious, to allow litigation costs so high as to discourage
litigants from bringing lawsuits." Id. at 235.
47. In an oft-quoted passage, Professor Goodhart commented: "Is not the answer to
this that the costs must be paid by one party or the other, and that . . . it is at least
more probable that the losing party was in the wrong? If New Jersey justice is so
much a matter of luck, it hardly seems worthwhile to have courts and lawyers; it
would be cheaper, and certainly less dilatory, to spin a coin." Goodhart, supra note
3, at 877. Other writers suggest that even if the unjust decision is reached, one cannot
ignore the fact that at the same time a great majority of litigants, who do justly lose a
case, unjustly burden their prevailing opponent with the heavy burden of attorney's fees.
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 797.
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a conclusion is equally applicable to the present rule, since its opera-

tion discourages just claims by those who cannot expect to recover
more than the expense to litigate.

An additional factor in the reluctance to change our rule is the
large part of the bar which relies upon the contingent fee for a major
portion of its income.48 A major, if not the sole, cause of our congested court calendars is the vast number of personal injury cases
which are handled on a contingent fee basis. 49 While contingent fees
do serve a needed function in our society by providing a means for
the poor to litigate their claims, surely the necessity of a contingent

fee system is in part attributable to the refusal of our system to recognize fees as costs. The contingent fee system is unique to our

country, probably because most countries have a system of fees which
does not require the aid of contingent fees to enable the poor to
litigate a valid claim. 50 The bar is very reluctant to adopt a rule,
however, that would eliminate a major source of its income. This

factor, plus the force of legal tradition, has maintained an emphasis
on litigation and a desire to retain the present rule on fees.

D. Qualifications of the General Rule
Despite the general rule that a winning party cannot recover his

attorney's fees, in some situations courts may tax fees as costs to the
losing party either through court-created exceptions or through spe-

cial statutory provisions. The court-created exceptions have been
based either upon the court's inherent equity power or upon strong

policy considerations, while in certain other situations both federal
and state legislatures have deemed it wise to award fees to the prevailing party.

Federal courts are endowed with those equitable powers possessed

by the English Chancery Court, 5' among which is the power to grant
48. The large plaintiffs' bar has resulted necessarily in a large defendants' bar. Together they form a large vested interest in retaining the contingent fee system. That
this interest is strong today, see Knepper, Defense Foreword, 1 AM. Jun. TIrArS xv
(1964); Lambert, Plaintiff's Foreword, 1 AM. Jun. TIuALs xi (1964).
49. For an excellent treatment of contingent fees, see F. MACKINNON, CONTINGErNT
FEEs FOR LEcAL SE vicEs (1964). See also Celler, supra note 28.
50. In most countries contingent fees are illegal as a champertous device. Additionally, there exists in these countries strong public policy against the increased litigation caused by a contingent fee system. Early economic and social pressure,
generated by a system of fees which resulted in an injustice to the poor who could
not pay their attorney to press a valid claim, resulted in the development of the
contingent fee system in the United States. Comment, Are Contingent Fees Ethical
Where Client Is Able To Pay a Retainer?, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 329 (1959); see F.
MACKINNON, supranote 49, at 36-38.
51. Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425 (1869); Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 369 (1855); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 518 (1852). For a complete examination of this equitable power to
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costs, including attorney's fees. In Guardian Trust v. Kansas City
Southern Ry.,5 2 a federal judge, after an exhaustive study of the limits
of equity jurisdiction, concluded that "it is clearly established that the
federal courts of equity have jurisdiction to allow in proper cases
costs 'as between solicitor and client.' "5 There is much uncertainty,
however, as to what those "proper cases" are, and in only two areas
has this equitable power consistently been applied. First, it is well

established that one who has created, increased, or protected a common fund which is in the hands of the court for distribution to claimants is equitably entitled to be reimbursed from the fund for his
reasonable attorney's fees. 54 Second, where litigation is clearly vexatious and in bad faith, the court has the equitable power to tax
counsel fees and costs to the losing party.5 5 In this latter situation,
however, the power has been sparingly exercised.5 6 Similarly, state
courts have exercised their equitable power to award fees as costs in
these two situations.5 7

Several other judicial exceptions to the general rule have developed.
For example, it is well settled that where one has wrongfully caused
another to defend or prosecute an action, then the latter can recover
all expenses, including attorney's fees reasonably incurred by him in
that action. 58 Moreover, the policy of upholding the parties' intengrant costs, see Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 2332 241 (8th Cir.
1928), reo'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1929).
52. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. By., supra note 51.
53. Id. at 246 (emphasis added). The case specifically held that a federal court may
award fees where a fiduciary has incurred expense in protecting property against
groundless actions.
54. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (protection of trust
funds); Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882)
(creditor's suit to protect secured property held by trustee); Drain v. Wilson, 117
Wash. 34, 200 P. 581 (1921)(recovery of fund for an estate). See also McCotxncIK
237-39; Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1149 (1927).
55. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. By., supra note 51; Gazan v. Vadsco Sales
Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934)(fees taxed against plaintiff who lent his name
to vexatious stockholder's suit). The Sprague case, supra note 54, has been interpreted
to approve the idea that fees may be awarded not only in a common fund situation,
but also in the case of vexatious conduct or bad faith. Note, Distribution of Legal
Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699, 708 (1940).
56. See Oelricbs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872) (fees not awarded under
injunction bond); Byran Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d
649 (3d Cir. 1967)(no fees allowed to successful defendant in vexatious private antitrust suit); Gold Dust Corp. v. *Hoffenberg, 87 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1937)(no fees
allowed for successful defendant of bad faith trademark suit). The policy which caused
reluctance here is probably the same which has caused the retention of our rule, i.e.,
the principle of free access to the courts demands that all must be allowed to assert
their claims without fear of penalty more severe than simple defeat.
57. See Strang v. Taylor, 82 Ala. 213, 2 So. 760 (1887); Weigand v. Alliance Supply
Co., 44 W. Va. 133, 28 S.E. 803 (1897). For a complete list of both federal and state
courts, see Annots., 49 A.L.R. 1149 (1927), 107 A.L.R. 749 (1937).
58. See McCotmICK 246-52; RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 671(b) (1938); RESTATEiruNr OF CoNTRAars § 334 (1932); Annot., 45 A.L.R. 2d 1183 (1956). For example,
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tions enables litigants to contract that the losing party will reimburse
the other for expenses incurred during litigation,5 9 or each may agree
to give a bond which will cover attorney's fees. 6° Furthermore, due
to the special duty of a husband to support his wife, most courts have
in the proserequired the husband to pay the wife the fees involved
61
cution or defense of suits for divorce or separation.
Many federal and state statutes have been passed allowing the recovery of counsel fees in specified matters. In the federal area, Congress has provided for the recovery of fees by the winning litigant in
certain actions under the antitrust, copyright,63 and patent laws
and to a limited degree under the statutes regulating interstate cornwhere one is forced to incur the expense of litigation by another's fraud or other
tortious conduct, or by another's breach of contract or duty, the former in a new
action may recover attorney's fees incurred in the prior action. For cases where persons
were wrongfully forced to incur litigation by another's tortious activity, see Turner v.
Zip Motors, Inc., 245 Iowa 1091, 65 N.W.2d 427 (1954)(fees recovered from defendant who caused plaintiff to defend action of replevin for goods defendant wrongfully sold); McOsker v. Federal Ins. Co., 115 Kan. 626, 224 P. 53 (1924)(plaintiff
recovered fees incurred in defending suit by BFP of insurance premium notes
fraudulently taken from plaintiff by defendant). For cases where persons were wrongfully forced to bear the expenses of litigation by another's breach of contract or duty,
see Edwards v. Beard, 211 Ala. 251, 100 So. 101 (1924)(recovery by buyer of
goods sold with warranty of title where third party successfully established his claim);
Seitz v. People's Savings Bank, 140 Mich. 106, 103 N.W. 545 (1905) (recovery by land
purchaser who, relying upon defendant's covenants of title, unsuccessfully defended
his title).
59. Generally there is no question that parties may contract to pay the fees of
another, but problems arise in interpreting the scope of the contract. See Eastman v.
Sunset Park Land Co., 35 Cal. App. 628, 170 P. 642 (1918). See also McConucK 253.
60. Such bonds are commonly given to serve the issuance of injunctions, attachments,
writs of replevin and the like, and contain covenants to pay "all expenses" if the writ
is wrongfully issued.
61. See Cason v. Cason, 158 Ga. 395, 123 S.E. 713 (1924); Jensen v. Jensen, 119
Neb. 469, 229 N.W. 770 (1930); Richard v. Richard, 142 Okla. 302, 286 P. 900
(1930). This rule has been codified in the majority of states. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. ConE
§ 173.3 (West Supp. 1954) (reasonable fees to innocent party in divorce); MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 518.14 (Supp. 1966) (reasonable fees to wife in divorce); WAsu. Rv.
CODE ANN. § 26.08.090 (1961) (reasonable fees to either party in divorce).
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), which allows any person injured by reason of any
violation of the antitrust laws treble damages and the cost of the suit, including
reasonable attorney's fees. However, even with this explicit statutory authorization,
courts have been reluctant to award fees in cases where only injunctive relief is
granted. See Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.
1928); Clabaugh v. Southern Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 181 F. 706 (C.C.N.D. Ala.
1910). Similarly, successful defendants in private treble damage suits have been
denied recovery of fees. See Byran Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co.,
supra note 56; Gillamn v. A. Shyman, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 534 (D. Alas. 1962).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1964)(reasonable fees may be awarded as costs).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1964) (reasonable fees awarded in exceptional cases). It is
interesting to note that although Congress has provided for fees in copyright and
patent laws, it has not done so in the trademark laws. See Maier Brewing Co. v.
Fleischman Distilling Corp., 539 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1966), aff'd, 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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merce,65 trust indentures, 6 and securities.61 Where Congress has not
specifically provided for recovery, it is clear that a court will not

68
award fees to the successful party in an action under a federal statute.

Although the majority of states either have no general provision
for recovery of fees or have retained in their statutes the amounts
set in earlier times which are now quite inadequate compensation, 69
some states in recent years have enacted provisions modifying these
restrictions. Alaska, for example, allows the supreme court to determine at their discretion what costs, including attorney's fees, shall
be allowed the prevailing party in any case.70 Other states, although
permitting the recovery of fees, have placed specific limitations on
the court's discretion in awarding fees as costs. 7 1 In addition, despite
the absence of general legislation, most states have enacted special
attorney's fees statutes which direct that "reasonable" fees be awarded
the prevailing party in certain limited types of actions. The most
common situations where such fees are allowed are actions against
insurance companies which do not pay claims promptly" and actions
against carriers for damages to freight or property.73 Among the
numerous other classes sometimes selected are workmen's compensation cases,74 eminent domain proceedings, 75 and statutory lien fore65. 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1964) (reasonable fees in action to enforce ICC award);
49 U.S.C. § 908(b) (1964) (reasonable fees in suit against water carrier for violation
of act).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 77www (1964) (reasonable fees).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964) (reasonable fees); 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964) (reasonable

fees).

68. See Philip v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460 (1873); Teese v. Huntingdon, 64
U.S. (23 How.) 2 (1860); Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischman Distilling Corp., supra
note 64. Although there is no current decision in point, it may be that courts could
award fees under the previously discussed equitable power or one of the court-created
exceptions.
69. See notes 14 & 15 supraand accompanying text.
70. ALAsxA STAT. § 9.60.010 (1962). Another modern example is the New York
statute which allows the court in its discretion to award sums as expenses in extraordinary or difficult cases. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 8303 (McKinney 1963).
71. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1404 (1965) (fees awarded by jury only if
defendant acted in bad faith and jury has awarded fees to plaintiff); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 18.010 (1965) (fees awarded only if amount sought to be recovered does not
exceed $3000).
72. See TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0127 (1959).

For decisions interpreting such statutes, see Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185
U.S. 308 (1902); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilson & Toomer Fertilizer Co., 4 F.2d
835 (5th Cir. 1925).
73. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1230 (1955); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art.
2226 (1964).
74. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. 1Ev. § 31-127 (1962); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 176.511
(1961); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1019, 50-1020 (1955).
75. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 1255a (West 1961); MrNN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 117.34, 117.35 (1961).
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closures.76 However, in these areas of statutory authorization, one
problem of judicial administration remains, and that is the determination of what constitutes "reasonable" expenses. Nevertheless, courts
have not found this to be insurmountable,7 and these8 statutes based
on "reasonableness" have worked very satisfactorily.7
E. Conclusions and Solutions
Although it may be argued that due to the above exceptions to
the general textbook rule, our system of judicial administration would
not be altered substantially by a new rule, the need for change
clearly remains. Fees, constituting the greatest single expense of a
litigant, have an immense impact on litigation in our judicial system.
In fact, the fundamental choice of whether to litigate is substantially
affected by the way in which the financial costs of litigation are distributed. Although many contend that our present rule must be retained
because it encourages litigation and gives each man an inalienable
right to go to court, such a view disregards the fact that many, if not
more, potential litigants are denied access to the courts because litigation expenses would exceed any amount which could be recovered.
True, the contingent fee has been devised to aid those who cannot
afford litigation, but in many ways its results have been unsatisfactory,
since the contingent fee has been a major impetus of litigation and,
thus, of the court congestion which plagues our judicial system. Our
system of fees, which in effect denies the basic rights to many by
allowing the innocent injured party to go uncompensated, creates
nothing but dissatisfaction and disrespect for the law and the legal
profession. As the importance of legal advice and representation increases, the public will surely demand a more effective system of
justice. If the bar continues to neglect needed reform, not only in
its system of fees but also in the availability of legal services, the
legal profession could conceivably suffer the same fate as did the
medical profession-that is, some form of "Legicare," a Government76. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 514.14 (1961); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-202,
29-203 (1955); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 60.08.050 (1950).
77. Generally, the courts have used Rule 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
as a guide to what constitutes reasonableness. Rule 12 mentions a number of factors to
be considered, namely, time spent, difficulty of the question, skill required, loss of
other employment, customary charges, amount involved, benefit resulting, certainty of
fee and nature of client. For an analysis of courts using these factors as measuring
rods, see 6 U. Cm. L. REv. 484 (1936).
78. One federal judge, for example, has commented that "it is possible to arrive at a
proper charge ... without much difficulty." In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1931). For an analysis of the problem, see Note, Distribution of Legal Expense
Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699, 711 (1940), which concluded that "the task
has not been highly complicated and in general the results have not aroused serious
opposition."
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financed legal service for all.79 Undoubtedly a system of.legal service
offices established by the Government would improve the accessibility
of justice, but surely our democratic tradition is better served if the
answer comes from within the profession. Thus, the legal profession
must act out of both professional responsibility and self-interest, or
the Government may well be forced to act in its place.
Before effective reform can be undertaken, the need for a change
in our rule must be studied in light of the two different philosophical
forces which underlie the problem. On the one hand our legal tradition is closely tied with our system of settling conflicts by litigation,
while on the other hand, as our civilization has matured into the complicated society of today, we have begun to realize the necessity of
settling conflicts by adjustments and compromise. Our judicial administration must be modernized to meet this necessity.80 Our courts
are clogged with personal injury cases; many are deterred from bringing suits on just claims by the expense they must bear; others will
settle or withdraw a valid claim due to the long delays which mean
greater expense in fees. Surely a more enlightened system would
discourage the bringing of vexatious suits, would encourage the settlement and compromise of the doubtful claim, and would assure litigation of the bona fide claims. Our present rule as to fees accomplishes
none of these objectives.
Once the reasons that the existing rule is unsatisfactory are fully
grasped, then the alternatives of reform must be considered. The
English system may seem at first glance to be the solution. Yet this
system not only relies too heavily upon lengthy detailed schedules of
fees, but also is subject to the following criticisms: (1) a litigant may
be ruined if he is not successful; (2) justice is not completely black
and white, and it is difficult to say that all the rights are on the side
of the winning party; (3) due to the great technicalities of our system,
it is possible for a party with all the merits to lose; (4) risk of losing
may well deter any doubtful litigant from asserting his rights.
Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested that a statutory scheme of percentage compensation for each service performed would be best;81
79. See Bradway, Will "Socialized Law" Be Next?, 29 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 13 (1945);
Note, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters: The Problem,
The Duty and a Solution, 26 U. Prrr. L. REv. 811, 813 (1965).
80. This point was emphatically stated by Professor Cheatham: "The law and its
institutions change as social conditions change. They must change if they are to
preserve, much less advance, the political and social values from which they derive
their purposes and their life. This is true of the most important of legal institutions,
the profession of law. The profession too must change when conditions change in
order to preserve and advance the social values that are the reasons for its being."
Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer
and the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 438, 446 (1965).
81. Such a scheme was based upon a synthesis of the present New York and
California codes. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 4, at 799-800.
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yet surely this complicated administrative scheme would not solve
the problem of fully compensating the innocent injured party, nor
the problem of our congested courts.
The Evershed Committee,8 an English committee commissioned by
Parliament to study in detail what the proper system of costs should
be, suggested a number of alternatives, both to the American rule
and to the English rule. 3 The alternative which gained the strongest
support was the Canadian system which awards fees found in a series
of scales based on the amount in issue. However, the scales are not
conclusive, and the trial judge has overriding discretion to vary the
costs where special reason is shown.84 Although favored by the Committee, this system was rejected due to objections by the bar that it
decreased the remuneration of lawyers and resulted in a system of
costs based not upon the actual amount of work done but upon some
artificial standard, such as the amount in issue.8
Another writer has proposed a statute based on the premise that
the judge shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing
party. He submits that the exceptions to the general rule have become the rule and thus bases his statute on the principle of "reasonable" fees found in those exceptions. 86
Of the systems proposed, this last suggestion would seem to have
the most merit, yet to use the author's own words "some departures
need to be made." The ideal system, however, would incorporate
the basic structure of his statute. The awarding of fees should be
mandatory, for judges would be reluctant to depart from the traditional way of assessing costs, unless a duty was placed upon them
to do so. Thus, legislation should be enacted directing the judge in
any court to award, in his discretion, fees as an item of costs to the
prevailing party.8" The standard again would be one of "reasonableness" as determined by the guidelines set out in the Canons of Professional Ethics.88 To meet the criticisms of the English system, and
to improve upon the inadequacies of the present system, the following provisions should also be included in any statute:
82. BEPORT oN SuPREmm CourT PRocEDURE, C~m. No. 8878, at 232-68 (1953).

83. Among the alternatives considered and rejected were the German system of
providing fixed costs in every case, based solely on the amount at stake, and a system
under which, at an early stage, a bearing would be held before a master who would
fix a lump sum for costs to be recovered. Id. at 238-39.
84. Id. at 241-44.
85. Id. at 245.
86. Additional guidelines for specific situations facing the court are included in this
model statute. See Stoebuck, supranote 4, at 211-18.
87. There is no constitutional impediment to such legislation. See Life & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934); Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, supra note
72; Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
88. For a discussion of the guidelines of Canon 12, see note 77 supra.
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1. A provision to encourage settlements and compromises. For example, if a plaintiff recovers no more than the sum formally offered
by the defendant, then the judge should be permitted either to
award fees to the defendant or to penalize the winning plaintiff
by denying him some part of his counsel fees. Such a rule would
surely serve the needed social function of clearing the courts'
calendars.
2. A provision to compensate for the hard case, that is, the case where
a party with all the merits loses due to some technicality. In such
a situation, the judge should have the discretion to split the burden
of attorney's fees as he sees fit.
3. A provision to prevent an unjust result where neither party is completely right. Again the judge should be able to apportion costs,
including attorney's fees, as he sees fit.
The purpose of this legislation is to deter vexatious litigation, while
encouraging the litigation of bona fide claims, and thus meet the
needs of our society without perverting the traditional sense of American justice.
III. INERRELATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW

The discussion in Part II has set forth the development of our
present system of fees, as well as comments on its faults and suggestions for its improvement. Part III examines a technical problem
arising out of. our federal system, the resolution of which in many
cases determines which party shall bear the burden of fees. The
proper solution of this technical problem may be a key to the improvement of our system of fees.
A. Setting of the Problem
The nature of our federal system has produced many complex choice
of law problems. Generally, the determination of what law should be
applied to resolve a particular problem is governed by three major
authoritative bodies of law-state law, federal law, and federal courts
law. 89 Federal law is that law, such as the Constitution, which is applied nationally by all courts, while federal courts' law is that law,
such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is peculiar to
federal courts. A brief discussion of the law on attorney's fees de89. The fourth authoritative body of law, international law, is not involved in this
discussion. For an excellent introduction into the problems presented by these
authoritative sources as applied to choice of law problems, see E. CHEATHAm, E.
GRSWOLD, W. REESE & M. ROSENBUro, CASES ON CoNFriar OF LAWS 595-697 (5th ed.

1964).
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veloped by each body of law is necessary before examining the problems presented by the interrelation of these three bodies of law.
1. State Law.-Generally, state law as to attorney's fees, as discussed
in Part II, does not allow fees to be taxed as costs. However, by
statute and through certain qualifications of the general rule, counsel
fees are often taxed as costs to the losing litigant. 90
2. Federal Law.-As noted in Part II, there are several federal
statutes which expressly provide for the awarding of attorney's fees
to the prevailing party.9 1
3. Federal Courts Law.-Federal Rule 54(d)92 provides that costs
shall be allowed to a prevailing party as a matter of course 93 unless
the court directs otherwise or unless other provision is made by federal statute or rule. 4 The phrase "unless the court directs otherwise"
makes the awarding of costs discretionary with the court; however,
the Supreme Court has warned that "the discretion given district
judges to tax costs should be sparingly exercised with reference to
expenses not specifically allowed by statute."95 Thus, generally, other
than the courts' inherent power to grant equitable relief in the limited
situations of a common fund or a vexatious suit,96 federal courts have
been reluctant to tax an item as costs unless such authority is found
90. See notes 69-78 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text. One other source of federal law
is federal common law. Although Erie eliminated the area of federal courts common
law, the advent of such cases as Clearfield Trust v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943),
and Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), which held federal
policy to control over state law in areas of national concern, surely indicates that
highly important federal common law exists. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of
the New Federal Common Law, 19 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64 (1964). However,
there is no federal substantive common law as to attorney's fees. See note 104 infra.
92. Fa. R. Crv. P. 54(d).
93. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, the general rule in federal courts
was that in absence of a controlling federal statute or rule of court, the prevailing
party was entitled to costs as a matter of right only in an action at law, while in
equity the court had the discretion to allow costs to either party. Ex parte Peterson,
253 U.S. 300 (1920). For an extensive study of costs in federal courts prior to the
Federal Rules, see Payne, Costs in Common Law Actions in Federal Courts, 21 VA.
L. REv. 397 (1935).
94. One further qualification confines the imposition of costs against the United
States, its offlcers, and agencies to those expressly allowed by law. Section 2412(a)
of the Judicial Code similarly provides that the United States shall be liable for fees
and costs only when such liability is expressly provided for by act of Congress.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1964). For a thorough discussion of costs in litigation when
the United States is a party, see Schiller, Costs in Litigation When the United States
Is a Party: A Modest Proposal,6 VmL. L. REv. 189 (1961).
95. Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., supra note 46, at 235. See also Cohen v.
Lovitz, 255 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1966) (discretion used only in rare and unusual
-*
instances).
96. See generally notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.
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Federal Rule, or in the practice of a
in a federal statute, a particular
97
particular local district.

The Federal Rules do not define what items may be taxed as costs,
but several Rules expressly allow the court to include expenses, such
as attorney's fees, as a sanction for certain proscribed conduct.9 8 There
is no rule, however, which states that counsel fees are always included

in taxable costs. Moreover, with the exception of the conventional

docket fee, 99 the federal Judicial Code, in listing items which may
be included in costs in federal courts, omits all reference to attorney's
fees.'

B. The Interrelation Problem
The most crucial problem in the interrelation of these bodies of
law arises when one law awards fees and another denies them, and

the court must choose which law is to be applied. The following
discussion will examine this situation as it occurs in state and federal
courts.
1. State Courts.-Assuning no horizontal conflict of laws question
exists, there is no problem with a state cause of action in a state court,

for the court will apply the existing state statutory and decisional law
to determine whether fees may be taxed to the losing party as an
item of costs. Similarly, where the cause of action is based upon a
federal statute which speaks in mandatory terms as to the awarding

of fees as costs, there is no problem, for the state court must follow

such direction even though contrary to its own law.101 However, if

the federal statute is silent on the matter, then in most cases the state
court may follow its own law to determine whether or not to award
counsel fees as costs to the prevailing party.102
97. See Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78 (1924);- United States v.
Kolesar, 313 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1963); Swalley v. Addressograph-Nfultigraph Corp.,
168 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1949).
98. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) ("reasonable" costs of obtaining a deposition
from a deponent who refuses to answer); FED. R. Crv. P. 37(c) (costs and attorney's
fees paid by party denying, without reason, any fact of substantial importance);
FED. R. Civ. P. 68 (party recovering judgment less favorable than rejected offer
must pay costs); Fan. R. Civ. P. 41(d) (costs and fees paid by plaintiff of previously
dismissed action). For a list of other Federal Rules which may have some bearing
on costs and counsel fees, see 6 J.MooRni FEDEmAL PnACnCE ff 54.72, at 1323 (2d ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
99. An attorney's docket fee of $20 is allowed in most cases in federal courts.
28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1964).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1964).
101. In such situations Congress has furnished the answer to the interrelation
problem by providing the substantive rule or by specifically referring to state law.
Examples of federal statutes speaking in mandatory terms as to attorney's fees are
set forth in notes 62-67 supra and accompanying text.
102. The only situation where state policy may not control is the case governed by
federal common law which is applied in state and federal courts to the exclusion of
state law. However, there is no such federal common law as to fees. See -note 95 supra.
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2. Federal Courts.-The problem of interrelation in federal courts

is emphasized by the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.1' 3 The Erie
doctrine, with its policy of discouraging forum-shopping between fed-

eral and state courts and encouraging uniformity of result, ended the
existence of a separate federal courts common law on substantive

matters. 1 4 In the same year as Erie, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established a uniform federal procedural law which is used
uniquely by the federal courts, even in the enforcement of rights
based upon state substantive law. 10 5 Thus, in a diversity action to

which federal law is inapplicable, a federal court must apply the
substantive law of the state in which it sits, while under the Federal
Rules it applies its own procedural law. 106 Yet no one test to charac-

terize an issue as substantive or procedural has clearly developed. 10 7
The problem has been particularly acute when a Federal Rule squarely conflicts with a state policy,108 thus presenting the court with a
103. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
104. Although Erie obliterated federal courts common law, there clearly remains
a true federal common law, i.e., a national law of the land, which is applied by federal
and state courts to the exclusion of state law, even as to substantive matters. See note
91 supra. See also D'Oench, Duhme & Co., v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). For
federal common law to arise, there must be present a national interest, such as arises
with commercial paper; it is submitted that since no such interest exists as to attorney's
fees, no federal common law has developed.
105. The Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant
to the authority granted to it by the Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964),
which granted the Court "the power to prescribe, by general rules . . . the practice
and procedure . . . in civil actions" at law. The Act, however, limits this power by
saying that the "rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right"
(emphasis added). Thus, the Rules govern procedure, but not the substantive rights
of the parties before a federal court.
106. The best example of this substance-procedure dichotomy as applied in the
federal courts is Sampson v. Channel, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 650 (1940).
107. Several so-called tests have been devised. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945), established an "outcome determinative" test which required that the
results in the federal court be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determined
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a state court. On the other band,
a subsequent decision, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op, 356 U.S. 525 (1958),
indicated that a balancing of state and federal interest should be determinative. However, Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), departed from the Byrd test and
focused upon whether a federal rule so altered substantive rights as to violate
the restriction of the Enabling Act that the rules not "abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive rights." It is submitted that in ending federal courts common law, Eria
has done its work and that courts should not view these situations as calling for
application of an Erie test, but should realize the real conflict is between the policy
favoring a uniform federal procedure and the policy of uniformity of result.
108. Prior to Hanna, courts faced with a conflict between a federal rule and a state
policy usually applied the state policy. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (state statute requiring security applied although Federal
Rule 23(b) does not so require); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337
U.S. 530 (1949) (state rule requiring service of process applied although conflicting
with Federal Rule 3); Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1952)
(state rule of joinder applied although conflicting with Federal Rule 18). But see
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conflict between the policy of a uniform federal procedure and the
policy of uniformity of result. In the latest Supreme Court decision
on the matter, Hanna v. Plumer,109 the Court decided in favor of a
uniform federal procedure, holding that Federal Rules are paramount
to any conflicting state policy, unless the rule exceeds the congressional
mandate of the Enabling Act by attempting to "abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right."" 0
The problem of interrelating federal courts law and state law as to
attorney's fees arises in both the ordinary diversity case based upon a
state right, and in the diversity case where jurisdiction is based upon
a federal procedural statute, such as the Federal Interpleader Act."'
More specifically, the problem may be stated as follows: If the state
statutory or decisional law allows or disallows the recovery of counsel
fees, does Erie's policy of uniformity require the federal court to apply
state law? The answer, as will be seen, is not a simple one."'
Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965) (Federal Rule 42(b)
controls over conflicting state statute); Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.
1959)(Federal Rule 25(a) used despite contra state policy); D'Onofrio Constr. Co.
v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958)(Federal Rule 14 upheld over conflicting
state rule). See also Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal
Rules, 3 VANo.L. RFv. 711 (1950).
109. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). Hanna specifically held that Federal Rule 4(d) (1)
controls the service of process despite a conflicting Massachusetts statute. From
Hanna one may conclude that any matter deemed to be a legitimate subject of the
Federal Rules will be controlled by federal courts law, notwithstanding any contrary
state policy. The result of such a conclusion is that Hanna will clearly promote forum
shopping, the very evil Erie aimed to destroy. See 78 HARv. L. REv. 673, 675 (1965).
111. A suit under the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964), is
clearly a diversity suit, since the only power source for the Act is the constitutional
provision that "The judicial [p]ower shall extend . . . to controversies between
[c]itizens of different [s]tates .... ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Thus, one of the
requirements of the Act is that there be "two or more adverse claimants of diverse
citizenship." However, there is a distinction between the ordinary diversity suit and
the diversity suit under the Interpleader Act. "Diversity" in the ordinary diversity
suit means maximum diversity, i.e., all the parties on one side must be citizens of
different states from all the parties on the other side. "Diversity" in the interpleader
suit means minimal diversity, i.e., parties on one side may be from the same state as
parties on the other side, so long as the citizenship of at least one party on one side
differs from another on the other side. Compare Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806), with Blair Holdings Corp. v. Bay City Bank & Trust Co., 234
F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1956).
112. The major source of confusion in the resolution of the question arises from the
failure to distinguish between federal courts law and federal law, and the resulting
failure to visualize the problem correctly. Many courts have concluded that federal law,
based upon Federal Rule 54(d), and not state law, controls the allowance or disallowance of fees. See, e.g., Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.,
209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953); Palomas Land & Cattle Co. v. Baldwin, 189 F.2d 936
(9th Cir. 1951). The fallacy is that federal law, except for federal statutory substantive law, is not involved in attorney's fees. Rather the real conflict is between
federal courts law, and its uniform procedure for federal courts, and state substantive
law, which must be applied to avoid forum shopping.

1238

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

EVOL. 20

In the ordinary diversity case, based upon a state cause of action," 3

the great weight of authority characterizes a claim for attorney's fees
as substantive and thus, in the interest of uniformity, applies the state

law." 4 However, some cases have held that Federal Rule 54(d) grants
the federal court such discretion with respect to the allowance of
costs, including attorney's fees, that its exercise cannot be curtailed
by state legislation.115 In essence, these courts have applied the federal courts law of the Federal Rules under a rationale very similar to
6
that used in the Hanna case."

The policies underlying the minority view are clear, and perhaps
justified. To retain some control over the taxing of fees in its courts,
and thus over the conduct of the litigants, the minority has concluded
that it is within federal discretion to disregard state law as to attorney's
fees. In the ordinary diversity suit, however, it is submitted that the

substantive law of the state in which the court is sitting should be
controlling. The policy of Erie to avoid forum-shopping is so strong

that no federal court should grant a remedy which will lead to a
result different from that obtainable in the state court, unless an
equally strong countervailing policy exists demanding application of
federal courts law. The Hanna case indicates that when such a policy

exists in a Federal Rule, it is to be applied to the exclusion of state

law."n Thus, the minority will argue that such a policy is present in

the direction of Federal Rule 54(d) to award costs to the prevailing
party. It is submitted that such reasoning ignores the basic distinc-

tion between "costs" and "fees." The awarding of counsel fees as costs
113. This action is brought under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1966),
which states that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, . . . and is between citizens
of different states ....
"
114. See, e.g., Stokes v. Reeves, 245 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1957) (Texas law applied
to allow fees); Trust Co. v. National Sur. Corp., 177 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1949) (Illinois
law applied denying attorney's fees); Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Anderson's Groves, 176
F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1949) (Florida statute awarding fees as costs applied); Danza v.
National Bank, 222 F. Supp. 671 (D. Alas. 1963) (Alaska law applied to allow fees).
See also 6 MOORE 1154.77(2), at 1354-55, where Professor Moore concludes that state
law should be followed "where the state law . . . reflects a 'substantial' policy of the
state" and "does not run counter to a valid federal statute or rule of court."
115. See, e.g., Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 139 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.
1943) (California statute not applied); United States v. E. J. Biggs Const. Co., 116
F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1940) (Illinois statute as to costs superseded by Federal Rules);
Kellems v. California CIO Council, 68 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Calif. 1946) (Federal
Rules control but court may adopt part of state law). See also 3 W. BAnnow &
A. HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACncE AN PRocEDuRE § 1197, at 68 (1958), submitting that
state law should not control on the ground that a claim for fees is not "outcome
determinative" and thus should be governed by federal rules.
116. These courts did not rely on Hanna, which had not yet been decided, but
the reasoning that Federal Rule 54(d) controls costs to the exclusion of state law is
similar to that used in Hanna. See note 110 supra.
117. Hanna v. Plumer, supra note 109, at 471.
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is not part of the policy embodied in Federal Rule 54(d), for fees
were intentionally not included as costs under the Federal Rules except in certain situations." 8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
warned the federal courts not to use their discretion under Rule 54(d)
to award such items as fees." 9 Thus, Federal Rule 54(d) does not
provide a sound basis for the application of federal courts law; and
in the absence of a substantial federal policy to the contrary, state
substantive law should be followed by the federal courts.
Similar circumstances may arise with a diversity suit brought under
the Federal Interpleader Act.Im For example, suppose there is a common fund action under federal statutory law which fails to mention
fees, while the applicable state law forbids the assessment of fees.
Must the federal court follow state law, or may it apply its own equitable doctrine that awards fees to the party presenting the common
fund to the court? The policy of an interpleader suit is to prevent
the stakeholder from being subjected to the expense of multiple litigation of the rival claimants when he is a distinterested party. As this
procedure has evolved in American jurisprudence, a majority of courts
have deemed it just and equitable that the stakeholder be awarded
reasonable fees along with other taxable costs.1 21 However, when this
policy conflicts with a state policy which flatly denies counsel fees to
an interpleader, there is a definite split of authority. Some courts,
perhaps a slight majority, hold that federal courts law is controlling
and adopt reasoning similar to that used by the minority in the diversity situation; that is, in federal courts, the allowance or disallowance of costs, including attorney's fees, is discretionary under Federal
Rule 54(d), and is not determined by state substantive law.lm Under
this rationale, these courts conclude that since the cases arose under
federal law and were heard by a federal judge, his discretion under
Federal Rule 54(d) is not to be fettered by state doctrines.
Other cases, however, have rejected this rationale and have treated
the state policy forbidding the awarding of attorney's fees as "sub118. These situations exist where fees are awarded in the Federal Rules as
sanctions for certain prohibited conduct. See notes 98 & 99 supra and accompanying
text. In these limited situations it would seem that the minority's arguments are of
considerable merit.
119. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964). The Act states that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action of interpleader . . . if [t]wo or more adverse
claimants, of diverse citizenship .... ." See note 111 supra.
121. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
122. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., supra note 112;
Palomas Land & Cattle Co. v. Baldwin, supra note 112; Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of United States v. Miller, 229 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Minn. 1964); Hennessey v.
Fein, 176 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See 6 Mooan ff 54.77(2), at 1352, suggesting that state law should not control. For Professor Moore's comments, see note 125
infra and accompanying text.
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stantive;" thus, uniformity of result requires that these courts apply
state policy. 123 The reasoning of this line of authority is well stated
1 24
by the following passage from Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson:
I firmly reiterate my opinion that it comports and is consonant with funda-

mental legal principles to hold that the denying or granting of attorney's
fees relates to the substantive rights of an interpleader action. This being
so, a fortiori, the Erie doctrine precludes any discretion on behalf of the
federal courts; they must follow the law of the state.

Looking strictly at the policy underlying Erie, the latter cases appear to have the better argument, since to avoid forum-shopping
among federal and state courts no federal court should grant a remedy
which would lead to a result substantially different from that obtainable in the state court. Moreover, the rationale of the cases applying
the federal courts law of Federal Rule 54(d) to award fees is subject to the same criticisms which were made with respect to the use
of that reasoning in the ordinary diversity suit. However, a strong
federal policy is present with respect to the interpleader suit, as indicated by the following passage from Professor Moore's treatise on
federal courts:
With deference, we suggest that state law should not control. The federal
statutes on interpleader were designed to protect a party against rival claims
in situations where formerly he had no effective remedy; and the federal
courts should be able to effectuate this protection by awarding him reasonable counsel fees pursuant to traditional and long established equitable
principles. 125

In other words, Professor Moore contends that the Federal Interpleader Act created a new remedy for the person who interpleads, and
its availability or efficiency cannot, or should not, be restricted by
state law. Thus, Congress, in creating a new remedy for the stakeholder, has indicated that a substantial federal policy exists insuring
the stakeholder relief from the burden of all expenses of his turning
the fund over to the court. Moreover, the equitable power of federal
courts, as will be remembered, has traditionally been used to award
attorney's fees in suits involving common funds. In this situation, it is
submitted that the policy of Erie should not control but should yield
to the countervailing federal policy, with the federal court awarding
fees to the stakeholder. The basis of applying federal policy must lie
in the Federal Rules and the Hanna case; but as has been noted, the
123. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 206 F.
of China v. Central Scientific Co., 120 F. Supp.
Co. v. Harrison, 96 F. Supp. 537 (W.D. Ark.
HOLTZOFF, FEDumL PRACTICE AND PnocEDuRE
urged that state law should control.
124. 206 F. Supp. 63, 66 (N.D. 11.1962).
125. 6 MooRE ff 54.77(2), at 1352.

1962); Republic
Supp. 63 (N.D. Ill.
924 (N.D. II. 1954); American Cas.
1951). See aLso 3 W. BUmmoN & A.
§

1197, at 68 (1958), where it is
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present Federal Rule 54(d) does not provide a sound basis for awarding counsel fees as costs. It is suggested, therefore, that to provide
for the application of valid federal policy with respect to attorney's
fees, Federal Rule 54(d) should be amended to include attorneys
fees in costs. The amended Rule 54(d) should read: "The federal
court shall award costs, including attorney's fees, to the prevailing
party, unless the court directs otherwise .... ." This amendment would
not pervert the policy of uniformity espoused by Erie, since in the
absence of a demanding federal policy, the court would remain free
to direct in its discretion that fees be taxed as they are under state
law. Thus, by so amending Federal Rule 54(d), the Court would provide for the enforcement of a substantial state policy, while at the
same time preserving federal policies. 6 Additionally, the amended
rule is similar to the proposed legislation of Part II, and thus would
be helpful in the reform of our system of fees. With the awarding of
attorney's fees clearly within the discretion of the judge, the courts
would be able to operate toward effectuating those social policies demanded by our society today.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The failure of American courts to allow a general recovery of attorney's fees is an anachronism that should not be continued. The
social conditions present at the time of the development of our general
rule have long since disappeared in the mobile and complex society
of today. What is needed is a rule which encourages settlement and
compromise while being truly fair and compensatory to the parties
involved. The legislation proposed in Part II and the suggested amendment to Federal Rule 54(d) in Part III are designed to alleviate the
problems which have arisen from the application of a rule designed
initially to stimulate litigation in our frontier society. It is hoped that
the merits, as well as the inevitable inadequacies, of these suggestions
will at least focus attention upon a problem long in need of reform.
JAMES H. CHEaK III
126. For the view that all Federal Rules should be amended to provide for the
enforcement of substantial state policy, while at the same time preserving federal
policies, see Hill, Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1958).

